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1. Introduction
My aims in this chapter are threefold: first, to offer textual evidence in-
dicating that William James and John Dewey expanded—which simulta-
neously means criticizing and adjusting—the Kantian project; second, to
demonstrate that the pragmatic evolution of the Kantian a priori is a transi-
tion from the mental to the bodily; and, third, to highlight applied merits
of this transition. As with Immanuel Kant’s work, which emerged against
the background of Newtonian and Copernican revolutions, pragmatism
developed in the context of the next most significant scientific advance-
ment up until that point: Darwinism. Hence in addition to speaking of a
transition in thinking brought about by pragmatists, I examine its relation
to evolutionary theory.
Evolution by natural selection was one in a small flood of theories
of transmutation that began cropping up in the 19th century and earlier.
It is in fact difficult to overstate the impact of such outlooks and espe-
cially Darwinism on the trajectory of biology, social theory, economics,
psychology, and quite a bit more. In regards to understandings of mind
from the late Modern period onward, a speculative case can be made that
evolutionary accounts emphasized such intelligent action as adaptation,
which occurs on both a mental and somatic level. Arguably, this partly
accounts for the influx of motor theories of mind in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. The advent of experimental science played an additional
role in updating understandings of mind, while simultaneously supply-
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ing links between Kant and pragmatists. This is because experimental
science makes progress by actively manipulating and thus altering the
world. Kant took inspiration from this and argued that the world must
be altered and brought into conformity with cognition to be coherently
registered. Pragmatists, also drawing insights from experimental science,
maintained something similar, only in this case discussing how bodily ac-
tivities pull experience into coherent form. Nelson Goodman (1978, x) was
accordingly on mark—though for reasons he perhaps did not completely
grasp since he did not stress embodiment—when he suggested that Kant
pioneered a movement that set the stage for pragmatic philosophies of
world-making.
As is likely evident, I strongly believe in the legitimacy and fruitfulness
of embodied approaches and consequently defend them, attending espe-
cially to pragmatic contributions to their development. I also dislike casual
dismissals of past intellectual traditions insofar as they are almost invari-
ably unwarranted and follow from misconstruals of what people meant
in the historical contexts in which they thought.1 I accordingly challenge
those who neglect the relevance of Kant’s philosophy to embodied views,
along with those who dismiss the Kantian a priori as a dead end. In the
hands of pragmatists and like-minded thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, the Kantian a priori has evolved into embodied positions that shed
considerable light on human experience and have a range of practical im-
plications extending well beyond academic philosophy.
2. Kant and James
British empiricists provoked both Kant and James. For Kant it was David
Hume; for James it was primarily Herbert Spencer. Kant of course re-
1 Note that it is not criticism I object to, but rather casual dismissals. R. G.Collingwood
(1939), for example, complained that his Oxford University students often dismissed texts
without warrant, particularly through failing to grasp that they answer historically specific
problems. This also applies on a more immediate level, so that the meaning of the statement,
I threw the ring in the garbage, varies depending on whether the question was, Where is your
wedding ring? or Where is that cheap novelty ring? That identical statements have different
meanings when answering different questions indicates that we cannot understand texts
merely by reading the words in them. We must also investigate problems they were intended
to answer. I maintain that an examination along Collingwood’s lines can uncover standpoints
from which great figures in the history of philosophy make sense, even if one ultimately
disagrees and wishes to criticize. In addition to this, and unless there is a widely accepted
incorrect view, I think it is more fruitful and pragmatic to focus on what past thinkers
got right.
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spected Hume enough to recognize that the latter’s well-known skeptical
conclusions could not be dismissed out of hand. Kant’s solution was
not to deny the empiricist position with rationalist fortifications, but to
effect a reconciliation. In this regard, Kant may be compared to James,
even though he was sometimes scathing of his enlightenment predeces-
sor (cf. James 1890 ii, 275; 1992 [1898], 1096). James agreed with empiri-
cists that it is by experience that beliefs are justified. He added, how-
ever, that beliefs and especially interests can arise independently of expe-
rience. These direct our focus and lead us to make rational connections,
thereby giving experience coherent form it would otherwise lack (for re-
view cf. Crippen 2010, 2011). In his early and middle works, James (e.g.,
1992 [1878a], 1890 ii, Ch. 28) accordingly claimed to side with a priori psy-
chologists, even while rejecting their emphasis on logical limits.
In responding to British empiricists, Kant and James both inverted the
way that Western philosophers had looked at knowledge. According to
Kant (1998 [1787]), thinkers before him had held that “cognition must
conform to the objects” (b xvi).2 Citing difficulties with this approach,
Kant explored an alternative possibility, “namely that we can cognize of
things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them” (b xviii). In
other words, we can only register what is brought into conformity with the
structure of our cognition. Kant described his approach as analogous to
that of Nicolaus Copernicus, who decided to assume that the Sun is at rest,
and see what follows (b xvi). This thought literally changes how we must
picture planetary paths if we are to picture them coherently at all. Our
cognition thereby pulls objects into an arrangement, makes them appear
in conformity with it, rather than the reverse. Kant conjectured that the
same occurs on a more basic level, arguing that people have knowledge
and coherent experience only insofar as the world is actively pulled into
conformity with certain a priori, that is, logical limits (cf. b xvi–b xix). James
likewise maintained there are “a priori element[s] in cognition” (James
1992 [1878a] 897, fn.; also see James 1900 ii, Ch. 28). Only where Kant
specified ones such as “quality” and “quantity”, James spoke of subjective
interests. He asserted that interests and functionally similar mechanisms
2 In the pages that follow, I summarize claims from the second edition of Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason. No synopsis of Kant could be uncontroversial to anyone familiar with his work
and its diverse receptions, but I shall presume—without argument—that readers who have
long pondered Kant will recognize my approach as defensible. I will cite sections of Kant’s
Critique that have especial weight, giving page numbers of the second edition as republished
within the standard German edition of Kant’s works, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by
the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences.
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limit what things we notice and how we proceed “rationally to connect
them” (James 1879a, 12; James 1890 i, 287). James accordingly suggested
that “interests precede” our experience of “outer relation[s]” (James 1992
[1878a], 897, fn.; also cf. James 1992 [1878b], 1890 i, Ch. 11).
That Kant and James shared this commonality led them to adopt anal-
ogous, albeit not identical, approaches to metaphysics—metaphysics here
understood as a field concerned with the conditions under which any-
thing can be said to have “reality” at all. Taking a cue from the burgeon-
ing experimental sciences, Kant (1998 [1787]) maintained that reality can
only be registered through some sort of active manipulation of it (b xii–
b xiv)—that the mind not only acts to impose form on reality, thereby
reconfiguring it, but that it must act so in order to coherently register
anything as reality at all. The mind does so, again, by operating within
a priori limits that dictate how reality—which here means the phenomenal
world—is put together (b 161–b166). This “putting together” is an inter-
pretive act; things are united or synthesized—albeit often automatically
and pre-reflectively—by means of a priori conceptual forms; and synthe-
sizing acts are, in effect, judgments, that is, acts in which affirmations are
made about certain things. Kant implied, accordingly, that human experi-
ence of reality itself is necessarily judgmental.
Kant’s approach to metaphysics, then, was not to start with a theory
about how reality is and from there go to an account of what sorts of
judgments can legitimately be made about it. Rather, he began with the
assertion that mind is limited to making certain kinds of judgments and
from there developed a theory about how reality must be for the mind—a
theory, that is to say, about the structures to which reality must be made
to conform if it is to be registered at all. His approach, therefore, to le-
gitimating metaphysical judgments such as the principle of causality was
not to show that the principle is a fact observed in reality, but that it is a
necessary condition of humans experiencing reality as they do. For Kant
(1998 [1787]), this meant that the experiential basis upon which empiri-
cists challenge the principle actually presupposes it, thus rendering their
refutation self-contradictory (b 233–b248).
Where Kant justified certain metaphysical judgments on the basis that
they are pre-conditions of having any experience of reality whatever, James
justified them on the grounds that they are pre-conditions of particular
kinds of experiences. James thus approached metaphysics from the same
inverted direction, but understood metaphysical inquiry more narrowly
as “nothing but an usually obstinate attempt to think clearly and con-
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sistently” about fundamental tenets underlying a given field of human
thought (James 1890 i, 145). Put otherwise, he understood metaphysics
as the elucidation of fundamental guiding beliefs that enable particular
forms of life activity and therewith certain experiences, and underlying
all this, for James, was subjective interests. Oncologists, for example, en-
counter their world armed with an interested belief that cancer necessarily
has causes. In the same way that a statistician can only account for that
which is quantifiable, oncologists can only explain that to which causes
can be ascribed. This is where they focus their attention, accordingly. In
Kantian terms, oncologic realities can only appear as realities insofar as
they conform to the principle of causality. Thus the principle demarcates a
boundary beyond which oncologists cannot see. The principle is justified,
then, not because oncologists show it to be an observable fact in the reali-
ties they encounter, but because it is a precondition of them encountering
and dealing practically with the reality of cancer as they do.
A point at which James noticeably departed from Kant, accordingly,
was in his refusal to recognize any clear separation between what Kant
called “constitutive” and “regulative” principles. A constitutive principle
is one such as the principle of causality, which, for Kant, is a necessary
condition of anything appearing coherently to us. Because constitutive
principles delimit how things must appear, they also delimit the sorts
of objects about which one can have knowledge (Kant 1787, b 218–b21).
A regulative principle, by contrast, is essentially a pragmatic principle; it
is a guideline for action, a teleological rule “for seeking something we desire”
(Axinn 2006, 85). A regulative principle does not, on Kant’s account, play
a role in constituting how reality appears, and consequently does not pos-
tulate the existence of objects about which humans can have knowledge.
Kant (1998 [1787]) cited belief in God as an example (b 647). The belief
guides human action, particularly in moral spheres (b 661–3). Yet God,
Kant insisted, is not a reality about which one can have genuine knowl-
edge (b 667–b670). James agreed that belief in God can only be justified
on pragmatic grounds. However, he also held this to be so of causality,
especially the principle of causality (cf., James 1890 ii, 671). Against Kant,
furthermore, and approaching an embodied view, he urged that any be-
lief affecting human action is constitutive of experience, and thus of how
reality is experienced by us (cf., James 1987 [1902], 460–5).
More broadly, James broke with Kant by extending—and some would
say conceptually confusing—the a priori to include interests, inclinations
and personally held beliefs. Kant tried to show that logical constraints
Crippen – Pragmatic Evolutions of the Kantian a priori . . . 155
delimit a priori how reality must appear to all conscious beings who en-
counter things under the spatiotemporal conditions that humans do.
In calling these constraints “logical”, Kant asserted that they are universal
and necessary. In some sense, James recognized that a priori constraints
limit how reality appears. Yet he added that while many are necessary, rel-
atively few are universal. That is, he suggested many constraints are only
a priori or necessary in relation to particular purposes, activities, biologi-
cal constitutions and psychological dispositions (cf. James 1890 ii, Ch. 28).
Thus his task was not one of establishing logical limits, but of breaking
them down by denying their universality. This denial contributed to his
anti-skeptical project, for a metaphysical judgment about all reality is a
negative judgment. Materialism, for example, makes the universal claim
that all real objects are physical. More formally, it states that for any x,
if x is real, then x is physical ∀x (Rx → Px), and this is equivalent to
negating the existential claim that there is no x such that x is real and not
physical ¬∃x (Rx ∧ ¬Px). Thus on a concrete or existential level, the uni-
versal statement is a negative or skeptical judgment about certain kinds
of reality. By denying the universality of metaphysical judgments, James
did not abrogate skeptical practices, but rather restricted how far we may
cast our skeptical nets in a given instance.
Where James fundamentally agreed with Kant, however, and where he
arguably amplified one of Kant’s profound insights, was in his conviction
that we add to reality. “In point of fact”, he wrote, our world
seems to grow by our mental determinations . . . Take the ‘great bear’
or ‘dipper’ constellation in the heavens. We call it by that name, we
count the stars and call them seven, we say they were seven before
they were counted, and we say that whether any one had ever noted
the fact or not, the dim resemblance to a long-tailed (or long-necked?)
animal was always truly there. But [ . . . w]ere they explicitly seven,
explicitly bear-like, before the human witness came? Surely nothing
in the truth of the attributions drives us to think this. They were only
implicitly or virtually what we call them, and we human witnesses
first explicated them and made them ‘real.’ A fact virtually pre-exists
when every condition of its realization save one is already there. In
this case the condition lacking is the act of the counting and compar-
ing mind. James 1904, 472–3
Our judgments, James concluded, change reality; or “[our] judgments at
any rate change the character of future reality by the acts to which they
lead” (James 1904, 473).
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3. Bodily evolutions of the a priori in James and Dewey
The fact that James’s primary target was specifically Spencer—though
passed over earlier—is important. It is so because Spencer in fact offered
an evolutionary variant of empiricism in a neo-Lamarckian vein. Neo-
Lamarckism was indeed an extension of the British empiricist thesis that
the environment directly molds organisms. Only it extended the shaping
influence to encompass the body as well as mind, and expanded it fur-
ther to include pressures exerted on both individuals and their ancestors.
Though often presented otherwise, Lamarckism—whether in its original
or “neo” form—was not mutually exclusive of evolution by natural selec-
tion, first made public by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace in
1858. In line with this, Darwin left increasingly more room for it in each
edition of On the Origin of Species. Nonetheless it offered an alternative,
and James’s rebuttal of Spencer drew on Darwinism, especially its notion
of independent cycles of operation, which James (1992 [1880], 622) lauded
as “the triumphant originality” of the theory.
In Darwinian evolution, this independence simply means that vari-
ations occur for some reason, but are random in regard to whether or
not they are adaptive; and then, in a second cycle, the environment ei-
ther promotes or thwarts variations based on how well they contribute
to survival and reproduction. This insight was central to the account of
mind James developed in his early and middle period for two related
reasons. First, he noted the enormous complexity of the brain, and specu-
lated it is correspondingly instable and accordingly prone to ejecting new
ideas not solicited by the environment. Then, based on whether the idea
is adaptive or not, it either persists or perishes. Second and more im-
portantly, James maintained environments supply sensory variation, and
then depending on our interests or concerns, we either notice or ignore
them. Those that enter our notice affect us more. Without the chisel-
ing effect of interests, James insisted experience would be “utter chaos”
and consciousness “a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible [ . . . ] to
conceive” (1992 [1878b], 929; also cf. 1890 i, 402–3). This is because we
would attend to everything at once; we would consequently register little,
and our experience might even be rendered contradictory. For example,
in the case of Necker cubes, we might see opposing planes as simulta-
neously being front and back, thereby rendering something unpicturable
(cf.Crippen, 2015).
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A key parallel, then, between James and Kant—and later I will add
Dewey—that is worth re-stressing is that they did not believe minds are
mimetic devices. James—to repeat—saw his account as similar to Kant’s,
only with interests supplanting a more formally logical scheme. As James
put it in an early work, interests are “the real a priori element in cognition”
(James 1992 [1878a], 897, fn.), and about 12 years later he claimed to be
siding with the “a priorists” (James 1890 ii, Ch. 28). What I want to argue
is that this was the beginning of a pragmatic shift of the a priori from
the mental to the bodily. It was, to begin with, because it emphasized
visceral components in cognition. Although James sometimes drew a line
between interests and emotions, he occasionally acknowledged overlap.
And leaving aside what he said, conceptual overlap binds the two—for
example, to be in love is to be intensely interested in someone. Recent
research also establishes neurobiological overlap (e.g., Damasio 1999, esp.
273–4; Gregory et al. 2003, Matthias et al. 2009, Buldeo 2009). Emotions
have a visceral aspect, something most accounts, including James’s, along
with everyday life, affirm. This makes them emphatically bodily.
A more literal transition from the mental to bodily occurs with Dewey,
and this too relates to shifts that evolutionary theory brought to the in-
tellectual landscape, as well as Kantian debates ongoing in his day. Dar-
winism—not to mention Lamarckism—stresses adaptation. Adaptation
is emphatically related to the body but also intelligence, thus providing a
link between motoricity and mind (cf. Schulkin 2004, 8; Nyı´ri 2014, 136, fn.;
Crippen 2017 a, 118–9). In line with this, motor theories of mind abounded
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with Dewey and numerous of his
contemporaries anticipating figures such as Merleau-Ponty and in some
cases more or less stating what enactivists such as Alva Noe¨ state today.
Dewey in fact granted the rationalist position that we bring certain
structures to bear upon our worlds and actively work them into coherent
form, while agreeing with empiricists that experience is the basic stuff of
mind and knowledge. However, he criticized both schools for overempha-
sizing the mental side of this. As he put it, “[e]xperience carries principles
of connection and organization within itself” by virtue of arising out of
“adaptive courses of action, habits, active functions, connections of doing
and undergoing” and “sensori-motor co-ordinations” (Dewey 1920, 91).
He reasoned that this means even presumably non-conscious organisms
such as amebae have at least preconditions of experience. Dewey later
added, in a mix of rationalist and empiricist terminology, that percep-
tion is an “act of the going out [ . . . ] in order to receive” (Dewey 1934, 53).
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Thus when we reach out to receive, caress and handle a ceramic jar, glassy
smoothness and roundness are realized as perceptual effects; and whereas
we can roll the jar between our palms, the same action and hence same
experience is impossible with a crate. Here bodily structure and things
encountered limit actions and hence experience, supplying a rough ana-
logue to the Kantian a priori.
From this it follows—along lines comparable to those expressed by
James and Kant—that we can only know things by messing about with
them, a view also characteristic of experimental science. In addition
to accounting for some of the commonalities between pragmatists and
Kant, the scientific backdrop helps explain why Kantian and neo-Kantian
views are in the lineage leading to figures such as Merleau-Ponty (cf., e.g.,
Matherne 2016). In the case of James, who imported scientific methods
before they became formalized, the assertion could be both metaphori-
cal and literal. As discussed, he maintained that emotions and interests
chisel away at the sensory environment, meaning coherent experience de-
pends on altering things. More literally, he held that beliefs are mea-
sured by willingness to act, and actions can have world-changing con-
sequences that supply empirical verification or refutation for our beliefs
(e.g., James 1882). Dewey, in addition to appropriating scientific methods,
specifically adopted ideas from quantum mechanics and relativity, which
posit that observing things changes them and that properties—even so-
called primary ones—vary with standpoint, specifically, velocity relative
to observation.
Dewey saw all this as variations of what goes on in everyday life where
perception and cognition are not internal representations, but qualities
of world-altering interrelations in which both extra-organic things and
organisms partake. On this view, knowledge is likewise a product of
looking around corners, picking up things, prodding, hefting and oth-
erwise systematically altering conditions under which we observe them
(cf.Dewey 1929, 87). What we call “sensations”—here distinguished from
perception—are primarily important as provocations to consequence-ge-
nerating action (Dewey 1920, 89–90; Dewey 1929, 112). The fact that our
actions and therewith consequences are always necessarily limited means
that we cannot believe whatever we want. Perceptual experience is like-
wise constrained by limits on bodily action. Arms, legs, fingers and other
appendages cannot just do anything. Moreover, while they could in prin-
ciple move in unsynchronized directions, they nearly always fall into co-
ordinated rhythms when dealing with things (cf.Crippen 2014; Crippen
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2016a). This happens, for example, when typing. Movements of fingers,
arms, gaze, neck and torso all coordinate. It also happens when walk-
ing. A hiker’s stride presses into a sandy trail, and the trail presses back,
modulating and patterning the hiker’s gait, so that a series of interactions
integrates into experience. Here experience is not merely integrated in
the sense that it pulls together, but also because it arises out of a “thor-
oughgoing integration of what philosophy discriminates as ‘subject’ and
‘object’ ” (Dewey 1934, 277). Again, the yielding sand modifies the hiker’s
tread, the hiker’s tread the sand; and through this mutual shaping—this
integration of one to the other—the sandy quality of soft give is realized
and brought concretely into experience.
These explanations have obvious Kantian undertones, and Dewey’s ac-
count of mind and experience in fact emerged in his ongoing efforts to
circumnavigate debates between rationalists and empiricists (e.g., Dewey
1906, 469–75; Dewey 1920, 81–91; Dewey 1922, 30–1; also cf. Crippen 2016b,
2017b). After Kant, the debate mostly transmuted into one between a pri-
orists and empiricists. As in pre-Kantian days, however, it remained cen-
trally a dispute over the extent to which mind imposes form on the world
or the other way around. Against rationalists, Dewey (1922) chided that
our ways of cognizing follow from our ways of inhabiting worlds, which
is to say, from embodied habits. “Ideas [ . . . ] are not spontaneously gener-
ated. There is no immaculate conception,” he wrote. “Reason pure of all
influence from prior habit is a fiction” (Dewey 1922, 30–1). But so too are
the “pure sensations” of empiricists, for they “are alike affected by habits”
(ibid., 31). Empiricists, Dewey went on to say,
usually identify experience with sensations impressed upon an empty
mind. They therefore replace the theory of unmixed thoughts with
that of pure unmixed sensations [ . . . ]. But distinct and independent
sensory qualities, far from being original elements, are the products
of a highly skilled analysis [ . . . ]. To be able to single out a definitive
sensory element in any field is evidence of a high degree of previ-
ous training, that is, of well-formed habits. A moderate amount of
observation of a child will suffice to reveal that even such gross dis-
criminations as black, white, red, green, are the result of some years
of active dealings with things in the course of which habits have been
set up. It is not such a simple matter to have a clear-cut sensation.
The latter is a sign of training, skill, habit. Dewey 1922, 31
In sum, Dewey attacked rationalists for not being empiricists, that is, for
not recognizing the priority of experience; yet this is, funny to say, also
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why he attacked empiricists. “Our ideas”, he wrote, “truly depend on
experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which
they both depend is the operation of habits” (ibid., 32).
While criticizing both rationalism and empiricism, Dewey—despite
his emphasis on experience—sympathized with the rationalistic view that
worlds are brought into conformity with mind; and that it is by virtue of
minds having similar structures that common worlds arise, making them
possible objects of shared experience and knowledge. Dewey, however,
went on to add the world is subject matter for experience and knowl-
edge insofar as we have developed according to the structures of worlds
in which we commonly exist. We accordingly find some of our struc-
tures “concordant and congenial with nature, and some phases of nature
with [ourselves]” (Dewey 1925, 277, also cf. Dewey 1929, 208–22). So far
this sounds like empiricism. However, Dewey steadfastly insisted that
we—and indeed all organisms—contribute to the habits and patterns of
interrelating that make our worlds. As he explained, “habits incorporate
an environment within themselves”, and in this sense conform to it, yet
they are also “adjustments of the environment, not merely to it” (Dewey
1922, 52). It is to be expected, therefore, that experiences will be similar
insofar as we have similar bodies and needs, and thus deploy similar ac-
tions in the environment, impacting it and responding to it in comparable
ways, the intersection of all this constituting our worlds or experiences.
This position clearly resonates with Dewey’s idea (1981 [c. 1951], 361)
of experience as culture, expressed near the end of his life. While meant
literally, Dewey also employed the idea metaphorically in earlier writings,
once again to challenge the notion of experience as a correspondence of
inner life to an outer environment. “Any account of experience must”,
he explained, “fit into the consideration that experiencing means living;
and that living goes on in and because of an environing medium, not in a
vacuum” (Dewey 1917, 8). While this is—or at least should be—obvious,
this fact is [ . . . ] ignored and virtually denied by traditional theories.
Consider for example, the definitions of life and mind given by Her-
bert Spencer: correspondence of an inner order with an outer order.
It implies there is an inner order and an outer order, and that the
correspondence consists in the fact that the terms in one order are
related to one another as the terms or members of the other order are
connected within themselves. [ . . . ] [B]ut the genuine correspondence
of life and mind with nature is like the correspondence of two persons
who “correspond” in order to learn each one of the acts, ideas and in-
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tents of the other one, in such ways as to modify one’s own intents,
ideas and acts, and to substitute partaking in a common and inclu-
sive situation [or world] for separate and independent performances.
[ . . . ] The aim is [ . . . ] to form a new scheme of affairs to which both
organic and environmental relations contribute, and in which they
both partake. Dewey 1925, 282–3
In other words, experience is pre-eminently a mutually shaping transac-
tion, as in a conversation.
This implies, once more, that there are always limits on experience
and therewith cognition. It also means that both are actively constituted.
Even in periods of relative repose, experience is still structured around
possibilities of actions, instilled habitually through past dealings. The
structure of bodily capacities and things encountered accordingly become
something like transcendentals that limit possibilities of experience by con-
straining possibilities of action—points Dewey expressly acknowledged
(e.g., Dewey 1920, 90–1), despite his and James’s occasional hostility to
Kant. In the case of Dewey, along with James, Kantian frameworks were
not extinguished, as numerous scholars recognize (e.g., Carlson 1997, Pihl-
stro¨m 2010). Rather, in the hands of James and Dewey, the Kantian a priori
evolved from the mental to the bodily.
4. Contemporary implications
In addition to marking an evolution from the mental to the somatic, the
pragmatic views outlined—which I have argued are a bodily variant of
Kantianism—mesh with recent cutting edge ideas about perception and
cognition. This is so in areas ranging from neuropathology to J. J. Gibson’s
theory of affordances to enactive cognitive science to robotics and ai. For
the last part of my chapter, I will explore contemporary implications.
I will begin by elaborating on James’s account of interests in order to
better locate it in recent work. In addition to roots in Darwinism, James’s
ideas about interests have antecedents in C. S. Peirce’s philosophy. Peirce
(1982 [1878]) formalized the first pragmatic definition of meaning when he
stated that to ascertain the meaning of an idea, we need only “[c]onsider
what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we might
conceive the object of our conception to have” (266). An object concep-
tualized as “hard” conceivably has the effect of marring things which it
comes into contact with; one that is “hard” and “heavy”, to give a more
Jamesian illustration, the consequence of injuring toes up
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While borrowing from his slightly older contemporary, James departed
from Peirce by stressing the degree to which individual interests decide
what effects are attributed to conceived objects. People, he explained, fo-
cus on effects that they value, so that a mechanic might see oil primarily
as a combustible or lubricator; a carpenter, as a darkener of wood (James
1992 [1879b], 952).
Although James did not emphasize it as much as he might have, con-
ceptual overlaps, as already discussed, connect interests to emotions. There
are also neurobiological overlaps, which James of course did not have
means of detecting. But in his appropriately titled “The Sentiment of
Rationality” (1992 [1879b]), he at least outlined how emotional feelings
intertwine with decision-making and belief formation. Inconsistencies—
to give one example—clog thought. We find this blockage irritating, and
accordingly endeavor to escape, and the flow from thwarted confusion
to “rational comprehension” comes with feelings of “relief and pleasure”
(James 1992 [1879b], 950). This suggests we are emotionally driven to seek
rational comprehension, and emotions often mark when we have arrived.
The claim that emotion guides thought is not of course original to
James, with thinkers such as Hume (2000 [1740]) and Friedrich Nietzsche
(1954 [1888]) endorsing like positions. However, Hume and Nietzsche
maintained that most of our beliefs are consequently without basis, where-
as James insisted otherwise, arguing that emotions help disentangle the
irrational from the rational, and push us towards the latter. This is not to
dispute that there is a great deal of emotionally driven irrationality, as seen
in today’s political situation in the United States and elsewhere. At the
same time, when it comes to most of the immediate doings dominating
everyday life, we do tolerably well. Thus while most of us enjoy foods that
are bad for us in excess, we are also emotionally inclined towards nutrient
dense fare and adverse to pathogen infected substances that elicit disgust.
In this case, our emotional sense of agreeableness and disagreeableness
is consistent with our concern for health. Our emotions and interests are
accordingly grounded in what colloquially may be called “reality” and to
courses of action that are correspondingly rational.
The eminent neuropathologist Antonio Damasio has echoed essen-
tially the same position, albeit focusing overmuch on ideas first expressed
in James’s famous 1884 article “What is an Emotion?”, while neglecting
ideas introduced in “The Sentiment of Rationality” and similar writings.
Specifically, he postulates that holding knowledge in awareness is possible
only insofar as one can “draw on mechanisms of basic attention, which
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permit the maintenance of a mental image in consciousness to the relative
exclusion of others” (Damasio 1994, 197). This thesis, though Damasio
again seems unaware, is at the heart of James’s concept of consciousness
as “a selecting agency” that chooses “one out of several of the materials so
presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppress-
ing as far as possible all the rest” (James 1890 i, 139). In James’s scheme,
such operations require interests; in Damasio’s, they demand emotion,
which overlaps conceptually and neurobiologically with interests.
As an illustration, consider a patient of Damasio’s known as Eliot.
Eliot was a young man, who suffered brain damage after having a tumor
removed. In consequence, he had significantly reduced emotional expe-
rience, accompanied by sharply diminished decision-making ability, even
though his capacity to weigh pros, cons and repercussions remained intact.
His situation appeared analogous to one unable to choose between menu
items due to lack of preference and hence emotional pull. Not surpris-
ingly, his professional and personal life fell to tatters. As of 1994, Dama-
sio had 12 other patients with comparable damage, all exhibiting similar
deficiencies in emotion and decision-making. A stroke had incapacitated
one to the point that she appeared to have locked-in syndrome. How-
ever, upon talking to her after she experienced some recovery, Damasio
determined this had not been the case. She reported having felt little, and
consequently had not found her former state alarming. Accordingly, she
had not felt emotionally inclined to express anything. In Damasio’s (1994)
words, there appears to have been “no normally differentiated thought
and reasoning”, and correspondingly “no decisions made [ . . . or] imple-
mented” (73).
Expanding on challenges of his patients, Damasio (1994) yet again al-
most exactly repeated James’s views. In the case of Eliot, he theorized
that his cold-blooded reasoning had “prevented him from assigning differ-
ent values to different options, and made his decision-making landscape
hopelessly flat”. An added problem may have been that this “same cold-
bloodedness made his mental landscape too shifty and unsustained for
the time required to make response selections” (51). In James’s language,
it appears that Eliot’s lack of emotional engagement left him unable to dif-
ferentially value competing options and to stay interested in and focused
on tasks.
From James and Damasio’s standpoints, then, it follows that think-
ing at least in part depends on emotions and interests. A Jamesian line
of analysis, with a little extrapolation, suggests the same for perception.
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We might see a river as navigable, as an obstruction, perhaps cooling,
drinkable, freezing or dangerous. This means perceiving it in terms of
possible actions and their consequences on us, which is to say, in terms of
use-values and hence interests. If we did not encounter a surging torrent
as emotionally threatening, and waded recklessly in, or a wall as a barrier,
colliding with it, onlookers might conclude we are blind. This is more
so in light of Gibsonian theories of perception, which are pragmatically
inspired (cf. Reed 1988, Heft 2001, Chemero and Ka¨ufer 2016), with Gib-
son (1979, 138) in fact hinting that affordances are emotional. Gibson’s
theory can accordingly be grasped as a tacit theory of values insofar as
it frames perception as the capacity to discern emotionally colored use-
values (cf. Crippen 2016c).
Dewey (1934) arguably went beyond James in emphasizing affective
aspects of perception. He observed that we “do not have to project emo-
tions into the objects experienced. Nature is kind and hateful, bland and
morose, irritating and comforting, long before she is mathematically qual-
ified or even congeries of ‘secondary’ qualities” (16). He thereby insisted
that the perceptual world is emotional all along and that we would not
perceive as we do—or as fully—were it not. We experience emotional
tugs almost constantly, as when a familiar face pulls our attention or an
interesting or threatening street invites us in or repulses us. Later in the
same book, Dewey characterized how values, emotions and interests in-
fuse lived space and time:
Space is room, Raum, and room is roominess, a chance to be, live
and move. The very word “breathing-space” suggests the choking,
the oppression that results when things are constricted. [. . . ] What
is true of space is true of time. We need a “space of time” in which
to accomplish anything significant. Undue haste forced upon us by
pressure of circumstances is hateful. Dewey 1934, 209
Such is commonplace in experience and accordingly knowledge, which
are nearly always value-laden, as pragmatists especially emphasize (cf.
Skowron´ski 2018). When caught in suffocating traffic, for example, we
feel moments thickening and our surroundings weighing in on us, and
this characterizes our lived understanding of time and space.
Reinforcing James and Dewey’s views and tying them to Gibson is
a body of research on affordance theory. The theory holds we perceive
things in terms of actions we might take. Lending support to the outlook,
experiments have found that participants judge distant grades steeper
when in poor health, fatigued, laden with heavy backpacks or suffering
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low blood sugar (Proffitt et al. 1995, Bhalla and Proffitt 1999, Proffitt 2006,
Schnall, Zadra and Proffitt 2010; Zadra et al. 2010). Perceived steepness
comes with deflation or sometimes excitement if one is a fit and enthusias-
tic hiker. These emotional timbres, in turn, correspond to the difficulty or
ease of navigating one’s body, which is to say, the world as a given individ-
ual encounters it. Conventional understandings would of course take this
as evidence of the non-veridical nature of perception. However, the fore-
going account suggests that the just mention perceptual variations follow
from the fact that agents are objectively equipped to do different things in
given environments and that they accurately register these differences.
This last point applies fairly generally. Thus, for example, it is no
mere mental variation that differentiates the human experience of caress-
ing lacquered wood with fingertips from that of a cat digging into it with
claws (Crippen 2017a). It is a difference realized in action, and actions
delineate the worlds of organisms. Moods and emotions likewise can re-
flect objective capacities relative to the environment at a given time. They
can accordingly delineate worlds by motivating or diminishing actions,
with perception reflecting this. To offer an illustration, it turns out that
lethargic, depressed moods correlate with aesthetic preferences for en-
closed and hence protected spaces. Conversely, energetic moods correlate
with preferences for open and therefore explorable spaces (Mealey and
Theis 1995). Accounts from phenomenological quarters—both philosoph-
ical and psychological—reinforce comparable points, as with Martin Hei-
degger’s (1962 [1927]) discussions of the world delineating implications
of care and concern or Nico Fijda’s (1986) characterization of emotions
as situational, action prompting characteristics. In short, insofar as our
attitude is nearly always one of wanting to do, get or avoid something
and therefore one of concern or interest, our worlds are emotionally and
therefore behaviorally qualified all along.
While emphasizing the interested or emotional and hence visceral as-
pects of our perception, these accounts are specifically related to the way
we deploy actions and habits when dealing with things. Insofar as the
body and its relation to environments are at the heart of all this, these out-
looks connect to embodied approaches, including Dewey’s, but also more
recent views. Echoing Dewey’s views, for instance, is Herbert Simon’s
(1996, 51) well-known illustration in which an ant moves intricately as a
function of the complexity of the contours over which it crawls. Simon’s
observations, like Dewey’s earlier ones about the amoeba, mesh with re-
cent experiments in which John Long (2011) created “tadpole robots” or
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“Tadros” to model evolutionary processes in aquatic environments. Long
varied the robots’ tail stiffness, allowing them to compete in a kind of evo-
lutionary game for the equivalent of food, in this case, light, with more
successful variations incorporated into the next generation. He reported
that successive generations developed better feeding behavior. As he put
it, “in a real sense, they got smarter”. Crucially, however, “they did so by
evolving their bodies, not their brains” or cpus (95).
Without insinuating his devices are future Nobel laureates, Long (2011)
stressed that “by virtue of being goal directed, autonomous, and physi-
cally embodied”, they “have intelligence” (95–96). In the case of Tadros
and in fact living organisms, much of the processing occurs through dy-
namics of agent-environment interactions, with only sparse cpu control—
or the neural analogue—exercised (Pfeifer et al. 2007, 81). The bodies
of Long’s (2011) robots, for example, automatically solve complex phys-
ical problems in the process of interacting with water: “In response to
the tail’s coupled internal and external force computations, the body, to
which the tail is attached, undergoes the yaw wobbles—recoil and turn-
ing maneuvers”. Its body accordingly calculates and performs patterns
of “acceleration that interact to produce the overall motion of the Tadro
according to Newton’s laws of motion” (104). Long argued further that
human-like intelligence requires both a body and brain, and accordingly
predicted human-level aiwill only come in the form of an embodied robot
(97). Though speculative, this is generally consistent with other contem-
porary embodied thinkers, with Noe¨ (2009), a leading enactive cognitive
scientist, stating that “[m]eaningful thought arises only when the whole
animal is dynamically engaged with the environment” (Noe¨ 2009, 8).
Notice in this scheme that bodily capacities once again set limits on
what can be done, and by setting limits, allow for the possibility of at
least preconditions of something functionally similar to human cognition.
Put another way, bodies fall into coordinated behaviors by dealing with
things in the world, and this forms an essential basis for perception and
cognition. It might therefore be said that bodily mechanisms stand in for
logical ones, and, by shaping activity, structure perceptual and cognitive
engagement. Though Long, who is not a philosopher, exhibits no aware-
ness of Kant, James or Dewey, his work displays insights generated by all
three. His work also illustrates how Kantian philosophy read through the
lens of Dewey and likeminded scholars such as Merleau-Ponty and more
recent figures such as Noe¨ can be rendered bodily, and, by this means, go
further in explaining the nature of intelligence and future directions in ai.
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The connections between visceral, rational and perceptual processes offer
similar leads. In addition to their meaning for human subjectivity, they
have implications for the dream of conscious ai and in fact suggest a con-
scious android such as Data from Star Trek who possesses formal logic
but no emotion would be a contradiction—a point illustrated when Data
expresses a preference for doing this or that, which has no basis absent
emotion.
5. Conclusion
Although this chapter has covered a lot of historical detail—and neces-
sarily so given my injunction about not dismissing the past, combined
with the fact that I have focused on Kantian and pragmatic philosophy—
my ultimate aim has been to show that the past very much applies to
the present. While not all of the contemporary figures discussed show
significant awareness of pragmatism, some such as Damasio do. Others
not discussed draw extensively on it, for example, ranking neuroscientists
such as Jay Schulkin (e.g., 2004) in his many books, along with a grow-
ing number of cognitive scientists, for example, Anthony Chemero (2009),
Shaun Gallagher (2017) and Richard Menary (2007). By extension, they
also build on Kantian debates that shaped the trajectory of pragmatism,
albeit doing so almost entirely without any explicit recognition, yet under-
standably since this is not their focus.
What I hope to have done in this paper, accordingly, is not only to have
outlined pragmatic variants of Kantianism, but also to have suggested ap-
plied merits and continued relevance of such outlooks. I have endeavored
to do this by pointing to how everything from rationality to enactivism
to affordance theory to ai can be understood and developed more richly
through an understanding of pragmatic evolutions of the Kantian from
the mental to the bodily.
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